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At the time of writing, US President Donald Trump is embattled in the White
House, Theresa May gambled and lost her government’s working majority at the
June 2017 General Election, BREXIT is mired in confusion, Trump has
pronounced trade wars a ‘good thing’ and transatlantic relations are unsettled.
Now is, therefore, a fascinating – if uncertain – time to consider the state of
Anglo-American relations. This article argues that concern for the special
relationship arising from Britain’s forthcoming loss of inﬂuence within the
European Union is overstated and obscures a more important consideration –
namely the economic capacity of post-BREXIT Britain to continue ‘paying the
price’ of special access to and cooperation with Washington. It also argues that
whatever Washington does or does not do during BREXIT negotiations will be
an important factor in how Britain emerges from the Union. The terms of
British departure are the province of Westminster and Brussels but proactive
American shaping of the environment in which BREXIT is negotiated and
effected could strengthen British prospects signiﬁcantly. Conversely were the
Trump White House to neglect or mishandle the BREXIT process it would risk
greater instability in transatlantic relations and the further erosion of America’s
most capable and reliable ally.
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Introduction
2016 witnessed an upheaval in the Anglo-American political landscape. In an outcome
less surprising than Prime Minister Cameron’s Party-driven decision to allow an in–
out referendum on British membership of the European Union (EU), the British
people voted for BREXIT. Then, disenfranchised middle America led a rebellion
against the US political establishment and placed Donald Trump in the White
House. The unorthodox and unpredictable Trump Presidency has since courted con-
troversy at home and spread uncertainty abroad. Meantime Cameron’s successor,
Theresa May, gambled – and dramatically lost – that an early General Election in
June 2017 would consolidate her political mandate over Britain and BREXIT. Presi-
dent and Prime Minister are thus both unusually weakened early in their terms and
preoccupied with difﬁcult domestic agendas and foreign policy challenges. At the
same time, as Britain and Brussels engage in tortuous negotiations about the post-
BREXIT UK–EU relationship, British and US leaderships must reassess bilateral
Anglo-American relations and where these now sit within their evolving foreign
policy postures and interests.
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This article argues that recent debate about the relationship between BREXITand
the health or otherwise of ‘special’ Anglo-American relations is somewhat misplaced.
Though important, it is not the pending loss of British inﬂuence in the EU that most
threatens them. There is an underlying resilience within the special relationship and
sufﬁcient meaningful cooperation in core areas of activity removed from the EU to
enable the relationship to continue. Rather, the key issue is whether the terms and con-
sequences of BREXIT will allow Britain the economic capacity especially to under-
write the continuing global role advocated by the May government and by the
Trump administration. How Washington behaves during BREXIT negotiations will
be important in this respect, not least in terms of how Trump’s ‘America ﬁrst’ approach
potentially runs up against British need to deepen international trade links with the
likes of China. Put bluntly, Britain’s post-EU future and utility to the US will best
be protected if the Trump administration shapes positively the environments of expec-
tation and practice in which BREXIT is negotiated and effected.
Resilience in adversity
One characteristic of Anglo-American relations since WW2 that has set them aside
from most other international relationships is their capacity to withstand change
and sometimes severe bilateral tension. Two examples of different types of acute chal-
lenge sufﬁce to demonstrate this ‘Lazarus-like quality’.1 First, there have been speciﬁc
crises within Anglo-American relations that might justiﬁably have broken or seriously
damaged other relationships. One thinks, for instance, of British bitterness at the terms
of the 1946 Anglo-American loan2 and the nuclear betrayal symbolised by the
McMahon Act, of American disappointment at British refusal to commit militarily
to the Vietnam war, of divisions over the Yom Kippur war that caused temporary
interruptions of UK-US intelligence cooperation3 and of the shock US invasion of
Commonwealth member state Grenada in 1983.4 And then, of course, there is the
most frequently cited example of severe Anglo-American discord – the Suez crisis.5
The Eisenhower administration’s humiliating compulsion of British and French
troop withdrawals from the Canal Zone is seen by some historians as marking the
moment when Britain ceased being one of the world’s great powers.6 France drew
from this experience the conclusion, which still holds fast within sections of French
society today, that the US could not be trusted and that France must develop political
and strategic options that avoided dependence upon the whims of Washington. In con-
trast the Macmillan government developed the concept of Anglo-American interde-
pendence and the ‘hug them close’ mantra that characterises British policy towards
the US through to the present.7 By December 1962, a remarkable recovery in
Anglo-American relations had been effected to the point that nuclear technology
sharing had been restored under the 1958 MDA and President Kennedy had agreed
with Macmillan at the Nassau conference to sell Polaris missiles to Britain.8
The second type of potentially acute challenge withstood by Anglo-American
relations is systemic change. Towards and upon the end of the Cold War, there
gushed forth a torrent of academic literature and media comment pronouncing the
end of the special relationship. Crudely put, the argument ran that without the Cold
War and a common enemy in Europe, British and American interests would
diverge, interaction opportunity lessen and the functionalist raison d’etre of the
special relationship dissolve such that the Anglo-American relationship would
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become ‘special no more’.9 Britain would become stranded between a receding Amer-
ican shoreline and a federalising Europe, and left clinging in the special relationship to
an empty and largely non-reciprocated political construct that provided an illusion of
continuity for a nation experiencing ‘a profound sense of powerlessness’.10 In the post-
Cold War years, these critiques of the special relationship centred increasingly on the
profound asymmetry between a middle-ranking Britain and the lone US superpower.
The realist calculation that had prompted British policymakers after WW2 to cultivate
assiduously the special relationship was that Britain would be able to ‘help steer this
great unwieldy barge, the United States of America, into the right harbour’.11 This
required access to US policymaking, which in turn had to be earned. As British
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon expressed bluntly in June 2003, ‘the country must be
prepared to pay a price, including blood, to prove that it is the most dependable
U.S. ally’.12 However American conduct, especially during and after the 2003 Iraq
war, encouraged an impression that the US had reneged upon this quid pro quo and
treated Britain instead as ‘largely a client state’.13
British ofﬁcials spent much time arguing, as Minister of State at the Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofﬁce John Battle did in January 2001, that ‘We are not a tail being
wagged by the dog’.14 Yet the lack of perceived American reciprocity made this line an
increasingly difﬁcult ‘sell’. President Bush’s ‘yo Blair’ greeting at the G8 summit in
2006 and Obama’s ‘kitchen meeting’ with Brown in September 200915 were widely
interpreted as demonstrating Britain’s ‘poodle’ status. In 2010, the British House of
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee controversially pronounced the special
relationship to be over.16 And even British public opinion reﬂected a sense of annoy-
ance and grief at Britain’s apparent impotence in Washington. AYouGov poll in May
2010 revealed that 85% of respondents thought the UK had little or no inﬂuence on
American policies, that 62% believed America failed to consider British interests
and that 74% considered Britain’s relationship with the US to have stayed the same
or deteriorated since Obama’s entry to the White House. Two years later, another
YouGov poll revealed that 84% of respondents still felt that the UK had little or no
inﬂuence on US policies and that 66% felt the US paid no attention to British interests
and that more people felt the relationship had deteriorated than improved since Prime
Minister Cameron had arrived in ofﬁce.17
There are plenty of examples since the Cold War that can be cited in support of
‘end of the affair’ interpretations of the special relationship. Prime Minister Thatcher
bemoaned the loss of her special relationship with Reagan and the George H. Bush
administration’s initial ‘conscious choice’ to prioritise links with Germany;18 on 31
May 1989, President Bush spoke publicly in Mainz of a ‘partnership in leadership’
between the US and Germany.19 Prime Minister Major rated Anglo-American
policy disagreements over Bosnia as being the most serious since the Suez Crisis20
and his personal relations with President Clinton were reportedly conducted on a
‘grin-and-bear-it basis’.21 Conversely, when during preparations for his ﬁrst meeting
with Major, an aide reminded Clinton to mention the special relationship, the Presi-
dent burst out laughing and said ‘Oh yes. How could I forget?’.22 Similarly, the
post-Afghanistan and Iraq campaign inquests drew forth bruising exchanges about
British tactics and capabilities, some embarrassingly publicised by Wikileaks, and
these fuelled doubts about Britain’s ability to contribute effectively to US-led
interventions.23
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Nevertheless the special relationship again survived. Functionally, special areas of
bilateral Anglo-American cooperation actually intensiﬁed, especially post-9/11.
Britain proved itself repeatedly to be America’s most capable and reliable military,
security and intelligence partner.24 And British leaders earned at least access to US
decision-making by standing shoulder to shoulder with US Presidents in times of
their personal and national need. In their respective memoirs, President Clinton
recalls his gratitude to Tony and Cherie Blair for visiting the White House in the
midst of the Monica Lewinsky political storm and George W. Bush wrote how his
phone conversation immediately after 9/11 with Blair ‘helped cement the closest
friendship I would form with any foreign leader’.25 Moreover, the imagery of
Anglo-American solidarity remained a valuable source of legitimacy for US foreign
policy, an important demonstration to the American people that they were not
alone in underwriting international security and a particular asset to the Bush admin-
istration in countering charges of its going into ‘unilateralist overdrive’.26 One com-
mentator noted of the Bush-Blair meeting in March 2003 that ‘The choreography of
the Camp David war council, so reminiscent of the FDR-Churchill meetings on
that very spot, seemed to echo the greatest moments of the Anglo-American
Alliance’.4
The question that naturally follows in this context of resilience is whether BREXIT
constitutes a shock of such magnitude that it overwhelms the capacity of Anglo-Amer-
ican relations to heal and regenerate? If past practice is any indicator of future prob-
ability, then the answer is no. BREXITwill diminish British value to the US but at the
same time has none of the potential for corrosive bilateral Anglo-American recrimina-
tion that, for instance, the Suez crisis offered. More importantly, British withdrawal
from the EU and consequent loss of inﬂuence is of a magnitude less than Britain’s
retreat from empire and the managed transition to US global leadership.27 Further-
more, EU membership has been an important but not determinate factor in the US
maintaining a series of privileged relationships with the UK. BREXIT does not there-
fore strike directly at the core functionalist, organisational or cultural underpinnings
of the special relationship that have imbued it with such resilience.
The US and non-EU Britain: BREXIT in perspective
It is important lest we forget that this is not the ﬁrst time that the US has had to con-
sider an integrated Europe without British membership. Despite the best efforts of US
policymakers, the Attlee government refused to join the European Coal and Steel
Community. The Churchill government poured scorn upon British membership of
the ultimately stillborn European Defence Community. And the Macmillan govern-
ment not only declined to join the European Economic Community but also led
efforts to undermine it via the creation of the European Free Trade Association.
While all of these instances of British attachment to national sovereignty and
refusal to be regarded as ‘just another European country’28 generated friction in
Anglo-American relations, none prevented the intimate cooperation in intelligence,
defence and nuclear matters commonly seen to underpin the special relationship.
The historical event most closely analogous to the present situation came in 1975
when Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s Labour government put to a referendum re-
negotiated terms of Britain’s EEC membership, which had itself been achieved just
two years earlier following French President De Gaulle’s vetoes of British applications
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in 1963 and 1967.29 It is interesting that archival records at this point show similar US
considerations at hand then as now. British membership of the EEC had recently
caused complications for Anglo-American relations, not just in trade but also over
the Yom Kippur War and the ‘Year of Europe’, with Europeans irritated deeply by
unilateral American announcement of this initiative and by Kissinger’s public descrip-
tion of Europe as having regional concerns next to America’s global responsibilities.30
Yet, the general American conclusion was nevertheless that the ‘mutual interests of the
United States and the United Kingdom are best served by a stable, prosperous and
outward-looking European Community of which Britain is a committed member’.
Conversely, the prospect of British withdrawal was described in sometimes nigh-apoc-
alyptic terms:
A healthy and realistic relationship is only possible if Britain remains in Europe. If the
British people do not see their future in that direction, but opt for a Little England sol-
ution… it is hard to see how this country can avoid slipping into international irrelevance.
In such circumstances, the United States would have to reﬂect very carefully whether we
would wish to carry on any kind of close (let alone “special” relationship which would
become increasingly lop-sided and probably an unacceptable burden.31
Fast forward to 2016 and much the same arguments could be heard, albeit this time
far more publicly. In April 2016, eight former US Treasury Secretaries penned an open
letter in The Times in which, while saying the referendum was a choice for the British
people, they pronounced a ‘critical’US interest in the outcome and advocated Britain
remaining in the EU. Lawrence Summers, President Clinton’s Treasury Secretary, fol-
lowed this up on BBC Radio 4 by advising listeners that in the event of BREXIT ‘I
think the special relationship would translate much less into prosperity for both our
countries and I think the special in relationship would have much less inﬂuence on
the broad world’.32 And then, of course, Obama lent the weight of the Oval Ofﬁce
to the Remain campaign. He suggested that a leave vote would put Britain at the
back of the queue for a trade deal with the US and spoke unequivocally about the
importance to America of Britain being in the EU:
I will say, with the candour of a friend, that the outcome of your decision is a matter of
deep interest to the United States…The European Union doesn’t moderate British inﬂu-
ence – it magniﬁes it. A strong Europe is not a threat to Britain’s global leadership; it
enhances Britain’s global leadership. The US sees how your powerful voice in Europe
ensures that Europe takes a strong stance in the world, and keeps the EU open,
outward-looking, and closely linked to its allies on the other side of the Atlantic. So
the US and the world need your outsized inﬂuence to continue – including within
Europe.33
It can never be known how the US would have reacted in 1975 to a BREXIT vote
but some insight to the likely approach can be gained by consideration of US reaction
to contemporaneous British defence cuts. The Cold War defence cooperation was
more central to the special relationship than was British EEC membership. American
ofﬁcials unsurprisingly looked askance upon the UK–US relationship when the Sup-
plementary Statement on defence of July 1967 announced major defence cuts and
accelerated British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. US Ambas-
sador to Britain David Bruce warned that a unilateral determination and announce-
ment of British cuts East of Suez risked incurring from the US President ‘a rebuke
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of titanic proportions’ andwas more likely than any other issue in the past few years to
cause ‘bitter’ Anglo-American controversy.34 On 11 January 1968, Johnson duly
expressed ‘profound dismay’, warned of grave consequences were the US left to
‘man the ramparts all alone’ and urged urgent reconsideration upon Prime Minister
Wilson.35 Secretary of State Rusk likewise berated Foreign Secretary George Brown
upon a ‘Little England’ posture, declared that the defence cuts represented by practical
and psychological effect a ‘catastrophic loss to human society’, and urged that Britain
‘be Britain’.36 As British defence cuts proceeded regardless of US pressure, Dean Rusk
speculated that ‘The concept of Atlantic cooperation could replace the special
relationship’.37
By the early 1970s, from an American perspective, the environment for further sig-
niﬁcant British defence cuts was still worse. Transatlantic relations were under signiﬁ-
cant pressure. Economic uncertainty was high in the wake of the Nixon shock of a new
economic policy that transferred burdens to America’s allies, the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system, and the Middle East oil crisis. The US establishment was
struggling to cope with American over-extension, the aftermath of the Vietnam
War, civil rights and Watergate. And Congress was reasserting itself vis-à-vis the
executive and demanding redress of alliance burdensharing. For example, the 1973
Jackson-Nunn amendment to the American Defence Appropriation Authorisation
act demanded that the government reduce forces in NATO Europe to the extent
that their foreign exchange costs were not met by the European allies.38
Prime Minister Wilson inherited from the Conservative Heath government grave
economic circumstances ﬂowing from the latter’s expansionary monetary policy and
consequent sharply rising public expenditure and ﬁscal deﬁcits.39 Spending cuts
were imperative and defence expenditure could not be exempt. Just as they did in
the 1960s, the British kept the US informed of their ongoing defence review discussions
and the Americans pressed hard throughout to minimise them. President Ford, for
example, impressed upon Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan that cuts should
not compromise the Polaris upgrade, Diego Garcia commitments or sovereign bases
on Cyprus, which were important for US signals and imagery intelligence gathering
in the Mediterranean. As the debate raged, US ofﬁcials again pronounced apocalyptic
consequences for the special relationship. In October 1974, Henry Kissinger advised
President Ford that ‘You have to operate on the assumption that Britain is
through’.40 Two months later, the US Embassy in London begged the State Depart-
ment to undertake damage limitation following reported remarks by Defence Sec-
retary Schlesinger that ‘we can no longer expect British to pull any weight’. Similar
protests were drawn in July 1975 following reports that Schlesinger had threatened
to cut off intelligence and Polaris cooperation in the event of further British defence
cuts; the Wall Street Journal simply opined ‘Goodbye, Great Britain: it was nice
knowing you’.41
So, did the special relationship cease? History tells us not, and the principal reason
for this is there being marked differences between what individuals say in moments of
crisis/frustration, what they might say as they seek to persuade a third party to adopt a
particular course of action andwhat they do in the aftermath of an event. In the 1970s,
Britain’s relative decline was offset partially by continued qualitatively special
cooperation in traditional functional dimensions of the Anglo-American alliance
and by an increase in the utility of British soft power.42 Much the same applies to
BREXIT which, ultimately, is less central to core elements of the special relationship
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than was the crisis of British defence retrenchment in the late 1960s–1970s. Once the
dust settles, policymakers reassess the balance of advantage offered by cooperation
and, if favourable, it continues, especially when undergirded by a long record of collab-
oration and particularly strong historical and cultural connections. As former US
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted in the after-
math of the BREXIT vote ‘The duty for statesman…“is not anguish or recrimina-
tion; it should be to transform setback into opportunity”’.43
Steering a steady course: global Britain
Beneath the furore and handwringing at the EU referendum result runs a strong
current of continuity in the disposition of the British people and in elite attachment
to a global Britain. Opinion polls are notoriously unreliable but considered over the
long term they show consistent trends in British popular opinion towards the US
and the EU. The latter, a frequent and sometimes unfair target of the British press,
has never captured the imagination of the British people. British turnout for European
Parliament elections has been notoriously low. Eurobarometer surveys also reveal
British conﬁdence in European institutions and sense of European identity to be reg-
ularly at or near the bottom of EU member state publics.44 In contrast, belief in the
importance of good Anglo-American relations and identiﬁcation with their American
‘cousins’ have been consistently strong features of British public opinion. In 2016, a
Pew Centre poll revealed that 61% of British people surveyed had a favourable view
of the US and 67% thought the US to be as important as it was 10 years previously.45
Where support for and conﬁdence in the US has dipped, these instances have usually
been short-lived and associated with a particular crisis or President. Interestingly, a
poll for The Independent in November 2016 indicated that 66% of British respondents
agreed that ‘Donald Trump as president makes the world a more dangerous place’.46
In February 2017, an Opinium poll reported that 64% of respondents considered
Trump to be a threat to international stability and 56% to rate him as untrustworthy.
Poignantly for this article, though, the same poll revealed that more people felt Anglo-
American relations would improve under Trump than deteriorate, that 58% agreed
that it is in Britain’s interests for the US to continue as a powerful nation and that
the public overwhelmingly sees the US as Britain’s most important ally. Out of a list
of 13 options, 50% selected the US; the second most popular answer was Germany
with just 9%.47 Popular doubts about a particular President do not, it seems, dissuade
general British afﬁnity for the US and the special relationship.
Neither is there much evidence to suggest that the BREXIT vote marked an elite or
a popular retreat to a ‘little Britain’. Attacked for compromising British international
leverage by advocating BREXIT, the Leave campaign reafﬁrmed an outward-looking
UK but one better able to control its own decisions and resources.48 Post-mortems
conducted on the referendum result subsequently foregrounded voter concerns not
for an internationally over-committed Britain but for sovereignty, security and
control over immigration from fellow EU countries. Following the vote Chancellor
George Osborne was quick to advise in the Wall Street Journal that the task ahead
was to ‘set out to build a more outward-looking, global-facing Britain, with stronger
links with its friends and allies around the world’.49 Though Theresa May soon sacked
Osborne upon becoming Prime Minister, she maintained his line on Britain’s inter-
national posture. Heading off to a G20 meeting in China in September 2016 May
Journal of Transatlantic Studies 7
afﬁrmed ‘The message for the G20 is that Britain is open for business, as a bold, con-
ﬁdent, outward-looking country we will be playing a key role on the world stage’.50
With little evident support for, or even consideration of, a ‘little Britain’ future, the
BREXIT vote inevitably ﬁred renewed debate about how Britain would redeﬁne its
role in the world. The May government itself answered this very much in the vein of
‘back to the future’. In her January 2017 BREXIT speech, May juxtaposed a new
‘Global Britain’with an EU that would remain a key partner but which was essentially
more parochial than the UK. The speech opened with the statement that ‘A little over
six months ago, the British people voted for change. They voted to shape a brighter
future for our country. They voted to leave the European Union and embrace the
world’.51 This impression of British re-emergence from an introspective EU was
underscored repeatedly. For instance, May noted that
Since joining the EU, trade as a percentage of GDP has broadly stagnated in the UK.
That is why it is time for Britain to get out into the world and rediscover its role as a
great, global, trading nation
She also recalled that ‘Many in Britain have always felt that the United Kingdom’s
place in the European Union came at the expense of our global ties, and of a bolder
embrace of free trade with the wider world’. The vote thus spoke to Britain’s distinct
political traditions, a history and culture that are ‘profoundly internationalist’ and a
resolve to ‘restore, as we see it, our parliamentary democracy, national self-determi-
nation, and to become even more global and internationalist in action and in
spirit’. In a clear echo of Churchill’s dictum that Britain was with but not of
Europe, May declared that while Britain was a European country ‘we are also a
country that has always looked beyond Europe to the wider world’. The British
people had therefore elected to return the country to its natural role as ‘Global
Britain’ – a term used no less than 11 times during the speech.52
Just over a year later, May delivered another set-piece speech on BREXIT. Again
she hailed ‘Global Britain’ and emphasised that ‘we will forge a bold new positive role
for ourselves in the world’.53 As a former global power that is dependent on overseas
trade to a greater extent than most industrialised countries, the assumption that
Britain has global interests and responsibilities has held fast for over a century. Succes-
sive post-World War 2 British governments have consequently preoccupied themselves
with reconciling those interests with dwindling relative power and with articulating
variants of global Britain that match its settlement as a middle-ranking power.
Churchill set the framework with his ‘three circles’: Britain’s relationships with the
US, the Commonwealth and Europe. While over time the relative importance to
Britain of each of these circles ebbed and ﬂowed, as did Britain’s ability to leverage
them for inﬂuence, the foreign policy contours and underlying mindset persisted
throughout the Cold War and beyond. Consider, for example, how Prime Minister
Blair’s vision of Britain in the world accepted the country’s fall into middle power
status but still echoed Churchill’s ideas of global British interests, responsibilities
and inﬂuence. In 1999 he constructed Britain as a ‘pivotal power’ whereby
We have a new role […] It is to use the strengths of our history to build our future not as a
superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and inter-
national politics which shape the world and its future.54
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These circles serve as mental maps and general characterisations of a British foreign
policy that developed in the aftermath of World War 2 and are still discernible in
May’s BREXIT speech. Dealing with Europe, she positioned Britain as a reliable
European partner, vibrant market and staunch supporter of an EU less Britain:
‘The decision to leave the EU represents no desire to become more distant to you,
our friends and neighbours… .It remains overwhelmingly and compellingly in Brit-
ain’s national interest that the EU should succeed’. At the same time, May referenced
Britain’s ties with the Commonwealth and English-speaking world, noting that ‘Even
now as we prepare to leave the EU, we are planning for the next biennial Common-
wealth Heads of Government meeting in 2018 – a reminder of our unique and
proud global relationships’.55 She even managed, in a speech about Britain and
Europe, to scorn President Obama’s warning for Anglo-American relations against
BREXIT: ‘President Elect Trump has said Britain is not “at the back of the queue”
for a trade deal with the United States, the world’s biggest economy, but front of
the line’.56
There is therefore little new in the May mantra of ‘Global Britain’ – and that is the
point as far as Anglo-American relations are concerned. Though it is leaving an inter-
national organisation of signiﬁcant economic weight especially, Britain will remain the
most outward-looking partner for the US in Europe and its reﬂexive Atlanticism will
now likely be complemented by even more assiduous cultivation of the special
relationship.57 From the British perspective, the US will be vital in navigating
BREXIT and developing ‘Global Britain’. The May government will want a strong
Anglo-American relationship to help compensate for the loss of EU membership
and to work with America in protecting NATO and in inﬂuencing from the
‘outside’ remaining Atlanticist EU states. Also, how America receives BREXIT will
be crucial to business and market conﬁdence in Britain, to the speed and interest of
other states in concluding trade deals with Britain and to global perception of post-
BREXIT Britain.
The US and BREXIT: a retreat to ‘Little Britain’?
Functionalist interpretations of specialness in Anglo-American relations especially
foreground calculations of mutual utility. The critical question therein is where in
the imbalanced relationship now characterising UK-US relations is the tipping
point at which the UK no longer warrants special treatment? This calculation was
laid bare by the US Embassy London in July 1975:
Our close and unique programs of cooperation will be increasingly vulnerable to criticism
if Britain’s role as a military partner continues to shrink. This is not stated as a threat but a
recognition of inherent relationship between continued cooperation in sensitive ﬁelds and
politico-military payoff which can be expected as justiﬁcation for these programs.58
Does BREXIT today, as debated in US analyses in 1975, constitute an inevitable
British retreat to international irrelevance? The British government unsurprisingly
argues not and, with popular support for an internationalist stance, is resolved
upon developing ‘Global Britain’. From the US perspective, too, there are core
facets of the special relationship hitherto calculated as worth preserving which are
not directly impacted by BREXIT. The overarching consideration remains that the
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US still has no more capable and reliable ally than Britain. In 2017, the British
economy ranked ﬁfth in the world by GDP.59 In 2016, the British defence budget
ranked third behind only China and the US. In 2015, OECD ﬁgures reveal the UK
contributed the second greatest amount of Overseas Development aid behind the
US. Britain also retains signiﬁcant structural power, especially its seat on the UN
Security Council, and the residual links of empire and Commonwealth remain
useful. Indeed, as the parameters of ‘Global Britain’ are debated, BREXIT has
been a ﬁllip for proponents of the Anglo-sphere and / or CANZUK.60 Just as impor-
tantly the UK generally looks actively to use its more limited resources to complement
American power, reﬂecting three calculations unaffected by BREXIT: its operational
assumption of staying close to Washington and the calculation that niche assets may
best yield inﬂuence; a vision of the international order sustained by American power
that is arguably uniquely close to that of Washington; and an experiential and cultu-
rally informed interpretative lens of world affairs sufﬁciently similar that Washington
and London enjoy a coincidence of policy selection unrivalled by any other set of
allies.
What functions can a post-BREXIT Britain perform of relevance to the US super-
power? With the caveat of no longer being able to serve as a US stalking horse within
the EU, what has necessarily changed pre- and post-BREXIT is limited. Britain can
still in principle offer America three important categories of assets: physical and
material capability; diplomatic and legitimacy. In terms of legitimacy, Britain can
be important in terms of refuting charges of US unilateralism and in maintaining
domestic support for US overseas commitments. The long history of Anglo-American
cooperation in conﬂict and the high relative regard the US people have for the British
people and their military sacriﬁce make Britain’s standing alongside the US particu-
larly valuable for American administrations. Consider, for instance, President John-
son’s desperation to have even token British forces in Vietnam61 and that President
George H. Bush considered British participation in the ﬁrst Gulf War to be ‘terribly
important’ as Americans knew that they were not alone.62
Diplomatically, Britain’s UN Security Council seat, ofﬁcial nuclear power status
and membership of numerous international organisations continue to offer opportu-
nities for Anglo-American cooperation on a range of issues of mutual concern, includ-
ing non-proliferation, terrorism, ‘states of concern’, money laundering and cyber
security. It can also use its diplomatic assets to garner support for the US; a former
senior ofﬁcial in the Clinton administration acknowledged that ‘when it doesn’t suit
us to push an initiative directly, the British will put it forward instead’.63 Furthermore,
Britain’s residual inﬂuence in its former empire and in the Commonwealth has proven
useful to the US since the ColdWar and has potential to remain so. As American focus
moves to the Asia-Paciﬁc Britain can potentially assist in safeguarding US interests in
Europe whilst also helping the US, through the Commonwealth, to connect the strong
points of its global security network. The UK-Australia Defence Treaty announced in
January 2013 is noteworthy in this respect, following as it did in the US–UK and the
US-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties.
As for material contributions, the US is a global military hegemon but, especially
given blowback from the 2003 Iraq War and simultaneously rising strategic challenges
in the Middle East, Asia and Eastern Europe, it does need allies able to make niche
contributions, capable of interoperating with US forces and willing to undertake
responsibilities the US prefers not to. Britain stands in this context foremost in a
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very short queue. Long traditions of cooperation, integrated command structures and
access to the same real-time intelligence enable easier and more effective Anglo-Amer-
ican armed coordination than with any other country. A threat landscape that prior-
itises detection and prevention adds value to Britain’s sophisticated contribution to
intelligence gathering and analysis. Furthermore, the Trump administration has
made very clear the importance it attributes to greater burdensharing; Britain will
likely push even harder for NATO military modernisation and strategic re-orientation
once removed from the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Mining down further into the special relationship, it is again possible to see
BREXIT as likely having limited rather than catastrophic impact on core aspects of
‘specialness’. The bilateral economic relationship is substantial. In 2015, the US was
the UK’s largest export partner (19.7%) and second-largest import partner (11.1%).
In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks, the US was the largest single
inward investor into the UK (24.5%) and the largest single outward investor for the
UK (23.6%) in 2014. From 2005 to 2015, the UK continually ran a trade surplus
with the US (with an average value of £28.1 billion) and from 2005 to 2014, the
value of FDI stock held in the UK by US investors grew 68.9% to £253.0 billion.64
Wherever BREXIT leaves Britain relative to the Single European Market will cer-
tainly impact some US investment decisions. But these ﬁgures reﬂect much more
than Britain’s status as an EU member. They reﬂect also similar economic philos-
ophies and consequent reciprocal conﬁdence in the institutions, policies and econom-
ies of the two countries. Indeed the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis resulted in close Anglo-
American consultation65 and measures, such the Bank of England regaining oversight
of banks in Britain, which further converged ﬁnancial practices and tightened the step
lock between the two economies.
In terms of defence, this is an area where EU involvement is something the US has
long been ambivalent about, wanting additional EU burdensharing but fearing a chal-
lenge to NATO. Britain within the EU was a strong ally in promoting the former –
consider, for instance, the 1998 St Malo agreement – and preventing the latter, includ-
ing blocking development of a permanent EU military Headquarters. However,
BREXIT does not necessarily make more likely an EU defence force that challenges
NATO or mean the complete evaporation of British inﬂuence vis-à-vis CSDP. First,
the loss of Britain so deprives CSDP of already inadequate military capabilities that
the threat to NATO primacy has in the short-term at least diminished. Some analysts
suggest that Britain accounts for up to 25% of EU defence capability.66 Any signiﬁcant
EU-led military action will thus likely depend on coalitions of the willing within and
without of the EU, including consultation with London. Second, assuming BREXIT
negotiations avoid serious damage to diplomatic relations, Britain and the EU are
likely to want the former associated in some way with EU defence development.67
Meantime, despite criticism of aspects of British military performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan, US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter’s plea in 2015 that Britain not cut
military expenditure smacked heavily of President Johnson’s fear in 1968 of being ‘left
to man the ramparts alone’:
Britain has always had an independent ability to express itself and basically punch above
its weight… I’d hate to see that go away because I think it’s a great loss to the world when
a country of that much history and standing… takes actions which seem to indicate dis-
engagement…We need an engaged United Kingdom.68
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Britain will almost certainly heed this call, not least because cooperation with the US
assumes even greater importance as its options to leverage CSDP in British interests
diminish. In fact, self-exiled from the EU and in pursuit of ‘Global Britain’, the
UK is likely to maintain its military to the maximum of its means, with its two new
aircraft carriers providing impressive – if costly – expressions of intent to project
power across the world. In addition, projects such as the F35 Joint Strike Fighter con-
tribute both to boosting British power projection capabilities and to tightening the
military link with the US in terms not just of procurement but also tactics and strategy.
It is noteworthy, for instance, that Britain’s new 65,000-tonne aircraft carrier, HMS
Queen Elizabeth, will during her maiden voyage tour the South China Sea in late
2020 and play host to a contingent of US Marine Corps F-35Bs.69 It is interesting,
too, that the F-35B marine variant for use on British and American aircraft carriers
will soon also be deployable on Japanese Izumo class helicopter carriers, which is
expected to provide greater interoperability with the US and Royal navies.70
As for the Anglo-American intelligence and nuclear relationships, these have long
been irritants to rather than dependent upon the EU. The Echelon global security and
intelligence sharing system speaks to levels of trust between key English-speaking
countries not mirrored with any EU country. Indeed, while the European Parliament
instigated an investigation into Echelon and industrial espionage, Anglo-American
cooperation intensiﬁed from 9/11 to a point that the UK–US intelligence community
was described as being an increasingly fused entity with exceptional ‘networked’ as
well as quasi-epistemic qualities’.71 Within the nuclear domain, a leading analyst
argued recently that US–UK nuclear weapon and delivery system collaboration
could ‘be argued to have become deeper and wider following the end of the Cold
War… and to be operating on a more equitable (though by no means equal)
basis.’72 Mutual beneﬁts include cooperation on the disarmament and non-prolifer-
ation agenda, forensics of nuclear terrorism, design and detection of improvised
nuclear explosive devices, and scientiﬁc collaboration - including joint work on a
new Reliable Replacement Warhead to modernise existing W76-style designs.
Managing uncertainty
Logic suggests that BREXIT will attenuate the Anglo-American special relationship
but not to the extent that defence cuts into the 1970s did. BREXIT reﬂects and
strengthens rather than weakens British Atlanticism. It has none of the potential for
recrimination of much more serious bilateral disagreements; indeed, President
Trump welcomed it. It does not strike vitally at core functional domains of Anglo-
American cooperation. And the key sources of resilience in Anglo-American relations
– the so-called coral reef or layer cake of transatlantic linkages – remain largely
intact.73
Yet none of this means the special relationship will not whither as a consequence of
BREXIT. Though of signiﬁcant import, the key determinate herein is not Britain’s
reduced inﬂuence vis-à-vis EU countries as a result of leaving the Union. True, the
US made clear its strong preference for the UK to remain part of the EU and will
regret the loss of British insider advocacy of a Union able andwilling to better burden-
share with the US, of particular policy positions favoured byWashington such as sanc-
tions on Iran and ﬁrming European responses to Russia over Ukraine, and of
muscular international free trade – irrespective of the Trump administration’s selective
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protectionism. At the same time, though, there will likely be some ambiguity in US
attitudes towards BREXIT, as indeed there is towards the EU itself. For a start,
Britain never developed meaningful trilateralism in the EU as hoped for by Prime
Minister Blair74 and its traditional self-appointed role as a transatlantic bridge had
become tenuous at best. Blair equated it to a ‘high-wire act’ during the Iraq crisis;
some suggested that the bridge had collapsed and could not be rebuilt.75 Washington
is actually accustomed to working different key bilateral relations with EU countries
dependent upon the issues at hand. The US will likely also continue to work with
London to court remaining EU Atlanticists and use fears of Russia in Eastern
Europe to strengthen NATO. Some, such as former US Ambassador to the UN
John Bolton, have even suggested that Britain liberated of the EU will be a stronger
partner to the US in renewing NATO.76
Those in Washington critical of resource duplication and possible EU rivalry with
NATO through CSDP could also see BREXIT as an opportunity to deal a reassuring
blow to a meaningful autonomous EU defence capability that decouples the Atlantic
Alliance. Admittedly, France and Germany have reacted to BREXIT with renewed
interest in boosting CSDP, the EU has agreed to deploy the Community budget for
the ﬁrst time for military purposes, and 25 member states have committed to perma-
nent structured cooperation (PESCO) in defence matters.77 Nevertheless, Britain was
arguably the EU’s most outward-looking and militarily capable power. Subsequent
EU access to these assets on an at best ad hoc case-by-case basis constitutes a
major blow to its ability to meet the full range of Petersberg tasks. Furthermore,
with France’s President Macron indicating that French defence spending may not
hit the NATO target of 2% GDP until 2025,78 France is unlikely to lead solely EU
states into much beyond low end Petersberg tasks. More challenging scenarios will
generally still be negotiated through national capitols, especially London and
Washington. And even if PESCO does deliver better than have other initiatives thus
far, such as the European Defence Agency, procurement lead times for modern
weapons systems especially are so extended that it will likely be years before meaning-
ful EU-generated capability uplift could be in place.
Assuming BREXIT does not shake the UK apart constitutionally,79 the likelihood
of which has receded somewhat since Scottish Nationalist Party losses in the 2017
General Election, the key to the future of the special relationship will be Britain’s
ability to re-orientate its external relations such that it has the economic capacity to
‘pay the price’ of inﬂuence in Washington. Already, for instance, the relative decline
in the value of sterling is putting pressure on British defence equipment spending.
In turn, this will depend on the eventual terms of BREXIT and of extra-EU reaction
to them. Naturally, there is much speculation about the outcome of negotiations but
the simple fact is that at the time of writing nobody knows how BREXITwill play out
and what consequences it will have for Britain, the EU, wider international relations
and the global economy. What is certain, though, in terms of Anglo-American
relations is that the US has a key role to play in the BREXIT negotiations. Assuming
that the US wants Britain to remain as strong as possible then the White House needs
to shape actively a constructive environment surrounding Britain and the BREXIT
talks. Herein Trump made a promising start, at least symbolically so. He returned
the bust of Winston Churchill so controversially removed by his predecessor to the
Oval Ofﬁce. He made Prime Minister May the ﬁrst foreign leader to be invited to
the White House and not only readily indulged the special relationship rhetoric but
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in stark contrast to Obama, drew attention to his familial roots in the UK. He also
broke with the standard American posture by welcoming BREXIT, declaring a ‘free
and independent Britain is a blessing to the world’,80 and by dismissing Obama’s sug-
gestion that post-BREXIT Britain would be at the back of the queue for a trade deal
with the US. Going beyond these atmospherics, signs of active Anglo-American devel-
opment of a Free Trade Agreement in readiness for BREXIT would help maintain
business and market conﬁdence in Britain. Sustained American engagement could
also help consolidate NATO primacy at a time of new uncertainty and diminished
capabilities within CSDP. Furthermore, quiet behind-the-scenes American diplomacy
might facilitate a BREXIT deal that the 27 EU countries plus Britain could all live
with.
Yet the timing for close Anglo-American coordination in managing BREXIT is
unpropitious. May’s ‘Global Britain’ is premised on developing British prosperity
and inﬂuence through a liberal, rules-based international order where the UK can
leverage its membership of international institutions, especially the UN, its network
of alliances, and partnerships – old and new. It also depends on Britain being able
to re-orientate its foreign economic relations, which in turn means a strong interest
in global free trade. Hence, for example, the government has invested in developing
a ‘golden relationship’ with China. The Trump administration’s aggressive ‘America
ﬁrst’ programme, epitomised by strong rhetoric against China and abandonment of
the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership free trade deal, rubs up against not only British interests
but also the essential basis of the post-WW2 Anglo-American order. It also risks pro-
voking new global relationships that challenge Anglo-American leadership of the
international order. For instance, US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement
has encouraged the emergence of an EU–China partnership in environmental leader-
ship. Similarly, and even more problematically for Britain, Trump has sent damaging
mixed messages on NATO, calling it ‘obsolete’ – and then ‘no longer obsolete’, and
declining to reafﬁrm explicitly his commitment to Article 5 in a set piece speech at
NATO’s headquarters in May 2017.81 Following that NATO meeting and a difﬁcult
G7 conference, Germany’s Chancellor Merkel felt compelled to declare ‘The times
in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over…We
Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands’.82 It would be strongly con-
trary to post-BREXIT British interests were the EU to devote time and resources to
building security capabilities as a hedge against US desertion rather than in partner-
ship with NATO.
Washington’s general attitude towards the BREXIT process also potentially
carries risks. The Trump administration might continue the ‘benign neglect’ of
Anglo-American relations that characterised much of the Obama period, an approach
driven not by intent but by preoccupation with domestic challenges andwith threats in
the Middle East and Asia especially.83 This is increasingly possible given the speed at
which Trump’s approval ratings have fallen, his domestic agenda become stymied and
his administration mired in controversy and instability. Alternatively – or in addition –
Washington might operate on the assumption that BREXIT so increases British
dependence on the US that Britain’s support can be ever more taken for granted.
Both scenarios are problematic. The former would likely mean Washington failing
to leverage its inﬂuence over BREXIT positively. The latter would be dangerous in
terms of elite and popular British sentiment towards America, especially at a time
when Trump himself is so lowly regarded beyond his support base in the US.84
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British sensitivity is high to American rhetoric and to accusations of the British
bulldog being neutered to the point of being Uncle Sam’s poodle. This was evidenced
in the uproar that greeted Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson’s statement in April 2017
that, despite a 2013 House of Commons vote that blocked at that time British military
action against Syria for its use of sarin gas, ‘I think it would be very difﬁcult for the
United Kingdom to say no’ were the US to ask for British participation in a new
round of strikes on Syria in reprisal for its use of chemical weapons.85
Finally these dangers are, at the time of writing, compounded by signiﬁcant
obstacles to May and Trump developing a strong personal relationship from what
was a promising start. May’s poor performance in the 2017 General Election dimin-
ished her international stature, weakened Britain’s BREXIT negotiating position
vis-à-vis the EU-27 and plunged the UK into political uncertainty. Coupled with a
calamitous closing speech at the Conservative Party Conference during which May
was presented with a ﬁctitious P45 document and inability to hold discipline within
the Conservative Party over BREXIT, all of this suggests that May’s attention will
for the foreseeable future be dominated by the ﬁght for political survival in a hung par-
liament and against potential leadership challenges.86 Meantime Trump’s controver-
sial policies and twitter diplomacy have attained a toxicity that raises the political
price for any British Prime Minister in maintaining a close relationship with the
White House and jeopardises popular British support for American policies.
Former British Ambassador to the US, Sir Christopher Meyer, declared undiploma-
tically in June 2017 that ‘Trump makes me puke’. And in a swipe at Theresa May’s
January 2017 visit to Trump, Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn promised British
voters in June 2017 ‘no more hand-holding with Donald Trump’ and that a Labour
government would ‘conduct a robust and independent foreign policy made in
London’.87 The charge made political capital, though the irony seems to have been
lost that Cameron made a similar criticism of Gordon Brown during the 2010
General Election, promising to be ‘solid not slavish’ in managing Britain’s relations
with the US.88
Past precedents indicate that Anglo-American relations are very capable of endur-
ing periods of poor President–Prime Minister relations and of then thriving following
changes in government or circumstance. There is no reason to suspect that this
capacity has been lost and a good likelihood that in the not too distant future US poli-
tics will return to a more internationalist posture and American diplomacy revert to
more conventional modes. The key issue with regard to BREXIT, though, is that
for the duration of the negotiations, barring unforeseen circumstances, Britain and
America will have uncertain political leaderships that are preoccupied with matters
other than Anglo-American relations. May and Trump are also unlikely to develop
a close President–Prime Minister relationship capable of holding US attention to
the BREXIT process and of ensuring that American inﬂuence is exercised construc-
tively. Even traditional demonstrations of Anglo-American amity at the highest dip-
lomatic levels appear difﬁcult; Trump’s planned visit to the UK has already been
thrice postponed amid fears of popular protest.89
Conclusion
History suggests that Anglo-American relations have a demonstrable resilience to
bilateral shocks, a capacity to adjust to circumstance and an enduring quality that
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sets them aside from most other international relationships. This does not mean that
the balance of advantage in a highly asymmetric relationship will not at some point tip
Anglo-American relations such that Britain regards the price of staying close to
America as too high or America regards Britain as so enfeebled as to not warrant
special treatment. BREXIT, though, is unlikely to be that moment. The loss of
British inﬂuence in the EU is signiﬁcant for Britain and the US but it is also an essen-
tially collateral shock for Anglo-American relations in the sense that it impinges in
limited ways directly on their core aspects of functional bi-lateral cooperation and
on Britain’s status as America’s most capable ally. In August 2017, researchers at Euro-
pean Geostrategy actually ranked the UK as the only global power – one step down
from superpower (the US) and deﬁned as ‘A country lacking the heft or comprehensive
attributes of a superpower, but still with a wide international footprint and [military]
means to reach most geopolitical theatres, particularly the Middle East, South-East
Asia, East Asia, Africa and South America’.90
Britain and the EU will, to Washington’s frustration, likely become more intro-
verted over the next couple of years. Hammering out the terms of BREXITand mana-
ging a probable transition period will dominate EU–UK relations. The May
government will have to wrestle with a hung parliament and likely ongoing questions
about its leadership. And the EU will have to devote considerable energy to managing
immigration, securing the euro and to combating ascendant forces of populism,
nationalism and separatism, as illustrated in Catalonia’s highly charged push for inde-
pendence from Spain. There will be economic uncertainty, too, as exchange rates and
markets ﬂuctuate in response to announcements and speculation about the terms and
modes of British withdrawal from the EU.
Nevertheless, Anglo-American defence, intelligence and military cooperation all
generally take place outside of the EU. And post-BREXIT, the UK is likely to
become ever closer tied to American economic cycles and to look even more to inter-
national markets in and inﬂuenced by the US. Indeed, just as when opposing British
defence cuts in the 1960s/1970s, the American apocalyptic discourse of opposition to
BREXIT has already given way to pragmatic adjustment. Similarly in ‘Global
Britain’, the May government is seeking to dismiss the predictions made in 1974/
1975 and in 2015/2016 that British retreat from the EC/EU would bequeath a ‘little
Britain’. In this task, of course, she is helped by growing US ambivalence about the
EU, the very limited list of capable and reliable allies at US disposal, and by American
desires of Britain being now of a quantitatively different (lesser) order than was the
case during the Cold War. Britain remains committed to trident, a key partner
within Echelon and capable of making niche contributions of military and legitimacy
value to the US. Furthermore, assuming the Trump administration does nothing to
provoke a solidarity in CSDP hitherto unseen amongst the EU-27, BREXIT can at
least in the short-term reduce US worries about a credible independent EU defence
force, de facto bolster NATO primacy and potentially reinforce the Atlanticism of
some remaining EUmember states – especially if Russia maintains its current pressure
in Eastern Europe.
The lasting signiﬁcance of BREXIT for the special relationship, therefore, lies in
what the eventual terms agreed between the UK and EU, and international reaction
to them, mean for British economic strength and the consequent credibility of
‘Global Britain’. These BREXIT negotiations are obviously a UK–EU bilateral
affair but the US will have a signiﬁcant bearing on how Britain – and the special
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relationship – fare as a consequence of them. The Trump administration made
encouraging noises about post-BREXIT Britain and freely indulged the trappings
of the special relationship during Prime Minister May’s visit to the White House in
January 2017.91 Washington could both further shield Britain during BREXIT
against the vicissitudes of uncertainty and speculation and capitalise upon EU uncer-
tainty to boost Atlanticism. Indeed, constructive American diplomacy, public demon-
strations of Anglo-American amity and continued functional cooperation ought in
principle to help BREXIT impact the special relationship less than some other
shocks that it has survived – including the British defence cuts of the 1960s/19170s.
The worrisome issue herein, though, is that the BREXIT timetable is progressing
at a particularly unpropitious moment. Trump’s ‘America ﬁrst’ programme is less con-
sonant with ‘Global Britain’ than was President Obama’s worldview of multilateralism
when possible, international institutions and free trade. The initial promise of a strong
President–Prime Minister relationship to navigate differences and coordinate positive
atmospherics of the special relationship has run up against Trump’s unpredictable and
controversial leadership and May’s post-General Election status as what former
British Chancellor George Osborne has called ‘dead woman walking’.92 Moreover,
this uncertainty ‘at the top’ of the Anglo-American ‘coral reef ’ of bureaucratic inter-
mingling magniﬁes the dangers ﬂowing from the relative importance of BREXIT
within American global foreign policy concerns. Those expecting the logic of
Anglo-American cooperation to deliver sustained and constructive US engagement
in the BREXIT process and its aftermath should at least draw pause from a
warning offered by Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to Washington, in July 1968:
the Americans ‘with so much else to think about… have little time or inclination at
present to remember their friends or to consider their worth to themselves’.93 It is a
caution that holds as good, if not more so, today as it did at the time.
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